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Josef Macek: How Do We Think? 
A Survey of the Ways of Reasoning.
(The posthumous publication of Macek’s
manuscript, introduced and edited by
Vladimír Benáček.) 
Prague 2006: The Karolinum Press, 292 pp. 
How much energy, faith, and intellectual
strength does one need to produce a piece of
work like the one in this review after suffer-
ing eight years of persecution and another
twenty years of exile? This certainly is one of
the questions that come to mind when read-
ing the last and as yet unpublished book by
Josef Macek (1887–1972) on thinking in the
social sciences. As a leading Czech econo-
mist, sociologist, and intellectual in the inter-
war period, Macek first had to renounce his
university career during the Nazi occupation
and subsequently fled the Gulag by emigrat-
ing to Germany, France, and then Canada,
and finally ending up in the United States,
where for eleven years (1950–61) he was a
professor in economics at Pittsburgh Univer-
sity. 
How Do We Think? transcends Macek’s
studies of economics and shifts the frontier
of thinking closer to the philosophy of sci-
ence by attempting to find common features
in the methodology of economics, sociology,
politics, law, and history. The book seeks to
demonstrate how humanity has been mov-
ing towards more rigorous ways of reasoning
in its proof of statements about facts, values,
or logic in the social sciences, but at the
same time has been unable to avoid abusing
that rigour by succumbing to the temptation
to prove the unprovable or to persuade the
consumers of ideas to accept ideological
statements biased by vested interests. While
today there are ethics committees in profes-
sional societies, peer reviews, and other de-
vices aimed at guaranteeing scientific accu-
racy and correctness, Macek, together with
thousands of fellow scientists that suffered
the atrocities of different totalitarian regimes,
experienced first-hand the effects of biased
trials and false proof. His thoughts and rec-
ommendations against premature judgement
and generalisations therefore carry a weight
that serious scholarship cannot ignore or dis-
miss. His book continues to be interesting,
inspiring and in many aspects contemporary
even today. It is also in a way testimony of
how Czech, Central European, and even
world thinking in the social sciences evolved. 
It was Joseph Schumpeter, a contempo-
rary of Josef Macek, who proposed the idea
that instead of concentrating on the argu-
ment of the author and the evidence he/she
has to support it, in the social sciences it is
the way in which these arguments are for-
mulated and defended that may be more rel-
evant. Rather than content, it is the form
of the explanation that in the more loosely
structured sciences the relevance of the
statements rests on. In this, his last manu-
script, which he died before completing,
Macek concentrated on the culture of per-
suading the public used by economists, soci-
ologists, politicians, historians, and lawyers.
The book looks at the statements that scien-
tists, and even casual observers and moral
preachers, claim about societies. How do we
prove our ideas? What can be considered as
satisfactory proof of their content? Such
questions become even more significant giv-
en the erosion of trust in objective truths (for
example, as was common in the case of the
belief in eternal principles derived from god
or natural forces) that has occurred over the
past 150 years amidst rising relativism and
subjectivism. 
Macek was a sceptic and strongly influ-
enced by Anglo-Saxon social thought after
the First World War. At the same time, hav-
ing directly clashed with two totalitarian
doctrines he was more sensitive to abuses of
every kind in the social sciences. Thus the
reader can relate to the ideas that Macek
puts forth in this unusual book, wherein he
draws from his extensive observations of
both the history and the controversies of the
modern world. He claims that while the
world has advanced to unprecedented levels
in technology, social behaviour and social
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thought do not seem to have advanced at
equal speed. As Macek claims, it was not
‘the blind forces of nature’ that caused the
majority of human disasters – most of them
have been man-made. Can this be under-
stood in terms of a grand failure of the social
sciences? Macek thinks not. Notwithstand-
ing their methodological limitations and the
risks of abuse, the social sciences have a pos-
itive explanatory power without which soci-
eties cannot progress.
This book opens with many interesting
‘case studies’, which are classic examples of
the social thought of sociology, economics,
or politics, where values always remain (of-
ten implicitly) a part of the argument. The
ways in which fallible humans treat their
ideas, declared as infallible truths, often turn
out to be ineptly comic, despite a history of
similar fatuous claims for the last 2500 years.
But learning has been subject to progress,
both in terms of what we do know and what
we do not. 
Josef Macek’s life has been filled with
ups and downs, and he shares the scepticism
of his generation, which was massively influ-
enced by the wave of revolutionary thinkers
from Central and Eastern Europe. Life in this
part of the world at that time provided rich
material for social observation. When at the
age of 62 Macek illegally crossed over to the
other side of the iron curtain, fleeing for his
life, he ended up at the University of Pitts-
burgh, where his ideas brought him to more
philosophical cogitation than was customary
for a professor of economics. In his view, peo-
ple strive towards a trinity of aims: wealth,
justice, and cognition (truth). They employ
fascinating capacities in their effort to achieve
them. The methodology of proof is an inalien-
able part of that quest. In this book he pro-
pounds the history of mankind as the fight
for truth, where the fight itself is often ‘a tilt
at the windmills’, with rules that are rather
opaque and the judges not always non-parti-
san. When, as opposed to G. Leibniz but in
line with K. Popper, we can never be sure
that our reality evolves ‘absolutely correctly’
(e.g. that we live in the best of possible
worlds), there is an enormous amount of
space for the social sciences to become in-
struments of human happiness, or converse-
ly for their abuse. Thus the methods of proof
remain the quintessence of the social sci-
ences.
Given its objectives (proof of facts, of
logic, of values), the methodology of proof
has a multitude of means at its disposal, not
all of which have an equally strong power to
prove. According to Macek, humankind first
used analogy to prove (or rather augur) divine
orders in the search for absolute truths. He is
sceptic about their validity, even though until
now such approaches remain a good point of
departure for continuing with more robust
techniques of proof – such as proof by fact
or by consistence with logic or with human
values. By accepting the possibility of con-
fronting ‘value judgments’ (e.g. policies or le-
gal prescriptions) with the methodology of
proof, Macek departs from 20th-century
mainstream economics. However, there has
been rising interest recently in many social
disciplines (e.g. in law and economics, axiol-
ogy or theology) in subjecting value systems
to the logic of rationality and discussing
their validity as endogenous or optimal enti-
ties. This will definitely long remain an open
side of all the social sciences.
Macek discusses other approaches to
proof by citing numerous examples of the
role of experience, statistics, or consensus.
Although their methodology and degree of
sophistication have progressed enormously
since the 1960s (see, for example, economet-
rics, sociometrics, experimental economics,
or data processing), many of their old weak-
nesses remain unchanged. Then there are
two less robust approaches to proof: proof
by authority and by tradition. In contrast to
the previous, their methodology has hardly
changed at all over time and has remained at
a rudimentary level. Nevertheless, and quite
surprisingly, contemporary social arguments
and political decisions still rely heavily on
such highly questionable underpinnings. 
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2006, Vol. 42, No. 6
1270
Proof of dubious value – proof by mira-
cle, sacrifice, martyrdom, death, and silence
– are definitely beyond the boundaries of
modern science. Surprisingly, as Macek ar-
gues, they have not lost their appeal in some
areas and many decisions made by other-
wise enlightened social agents yield to their
absurd implications. Even worse, sophistic
proof (i.e. in other words ‘proof’ by outright
lying, by ignorance, or by intentional sloppi-
ness) seems completely unacceptable. Un-
fortunately, as with the previous example,
real life is not resistant to their existence.
Many recent scientific techniques of proofs
by logic, mathematics or statistics are so ad-
vanced and complicated that their error or
abuse escape easily the attention of their
users. Technological advances and the sci-
ences are neutral to applications. They can
be used as much for the progress of human-
ity, as for its destruction. Thus lying can also
be done ‘scientifically’, as most of us know,
not only owing to Winston Churchill’s fa-
mous dictum that ‘the only statistics you can
trust are those you falsified yourself’.
How Do We Think is definitely not the
last word on the methodology of proof in the
social sciences. It cannot mask its mid-20th-
century origin or its 1930s-style of writing.
Nevertheless, the book addresses many is-
sues of the contemporary social sciences, the
limits of validity of their statements, and the
critical approaches to them for reducing our
exposure to their unjustified claims. 
In an age of ‘publish or perish’, when
quantity more often than not outstrips qual-
ity, Macek’s late-coming volume is unlikely
to attract a wide readership. Just as it was
when it could first have been published, i.e.
in the late 1960s, the book is today still a dis-
turbing piece of scholarship, because it in-
vites us to rethink and reconsider our output
before presenting it to a lay or a more scien-
tific audience. While this is often ruled out
by time and other constraints, with most of
us struggling to meet publishing deadlines
and get teaching agendas right, temporarily
renouncing premature exposition and look-
ing at it from the perspective of alternative
explanations may substantially improve both
the form and the content of that output.
Those who do read the book and absorb its
ideas will hopefully diffuse them in both
their writings and teaching, thus helping to
keeping alive the intellectual heritage of this
great Czech economist cum philosopher,
while at promoting the endless search for sci-
entific truth and its most appropriate form of
presentation.
Macek does not provide us with ‘a king’s
way’ of proving our ideas. While his Welt-
anschauung is anything but systemic – and
systemism, rightfully understood, and ac-
cording to the opinion of the author of this
article, may indeed be an alternative to
avoiding the type of scholarly pitfall, heroic
generalisation, or premature judgment of
which this book abounds with all sorts of ex-
amples – he nevertheless embraces one es-
sential of systemic reasoning: he recom-
mends that one transcend narrow discipli-
nary boundaries and the exposition of one’s
own findings into the less familiar terrain of
adjacent disciplines with a view to ultimately
checking their validity in the light of equally
relevant discourses. In the preface to the
book there is a reference to Sir Josiah Stamp,
a prominent English economist, banker, and
lawyer, which Macek has evidently included
deliberately. Stamp ascertains that he would
rather deal with the man in the street than
an opinionated doctor for a judgment in eco-
nomics, theology, or music, not least because
judgment, in his view, is more and more de-
pendent upon common-sense synthesis and
the convergence of different attitudes toward
life and its qualities.
How Do We Think is not one of those
books that should be left to disappear in the
shelves as part of a collection of rarities that
are never ultimately fully absorbed. The
book deserves a place close to the desktop,
where it can easily be consulted and is at
hand to be re-read again and again.
Jürgen R. Grote
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